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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Hughes' motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of an illegal seizure. This issue presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 11 15, 103 P.3d 699. And, 
"[w]hen a case involves the reasonableness of a search and seizure" the Court " 
affords little discretion to the district court because there must be state-wide standards 
that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials." State v. Barker, 229 P.3d 650 
(Utah 2010), quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 11 12, 78 P.3d 590 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 32; 
75). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
AT ISSUE 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
Austin Hughes appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. (R. 
68). Following denial of his motion to suppress, Hughes entered conditional guilty 
pleas, reserving his right to appeal, to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class 
B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502; Unlawful 
Possession of Alcohol by a Minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 32a-12-209; and, Immediate Notice of Accident Required, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 12.16.010(A) of the Salt Lake City Code. This 
appeal follows. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Austin Hughes was charged by Information filed in Third District Court on 
March 6, 2009 with: False Information With Intent to be Another Actual Person; 
Possession of Another's Identifying Documents; Driving Under the Influence; 
Unlawful Possession of Alcohol by a Minor; Driving on Alcohol Restrictions; 
Immediate Notice of Accident Required; and, Negligent Collision. 
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On August 21, 2009, Hughes filed his motion to suppress and the trial court 
held a hearing on the motion November 11, 2009. (R. 32; 40-41). The City requested 
a briefing schedule and oral argument was held on January 4, 2010. (R. 56-57). The 
trial court denied Hughes' motion on that date and entered findings on April 26,2010. 
(R. 69-70). Hughes filed his notice of appeal on April 29, 2010. (R. 71-72). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On February 15, 2009, Officer Ruff of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
witnessed Hughes "running" down the street. (75: 4). At the motion hearing, Officer 
Ruff testified that he witnessed Hughes "running" at 2:30 AM when the temperature 
was in the low 20's. (R. 75: 6). He further testified that Hughes was not wearing 
workout clothing or a coat, but instead was wearing a t-shirt and jeans. (R. 75: 6). 
Ruff testified that Hughes "ran" across the street and entered a bank parking lot. (R. 
75: 6). Ruff stated that Hughes"ran" in a diagonal across the street. (R. 75: 5). 
When questioned by the prosecutor regarding what Officer Ruff could have charged 
Hughes with at that point, Ruff testified that he could have charged Hughes with Jay-
walking and trespassing onto bank property. (R. 75: 8). Ruff followed Hughes into 
the bank parking lot and turned on his red and blue lights, tapped his siren and then 
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announced over his PA system that he was a police officer and asked Hughes to stop. 
(R. 75: 7; 17). 
Cross-examination revealed that Officer Ruff failed to articulate anything in his 
written police report that Hughes failed to use a crosswalk when running across the 
street. (R. 75: 14-15). Also, Ruff testified that he made at least 100 detentions since 
the arrest of Hughes and recalls all of the facts of his encounter with Hughes although 
he failed to mention anywhere in his report the allegation of Jay-walking. (R. 75:15). 
Further examination also revealed that Officer Ruff could not remember whether 
Hughes was wearing "running" shoes and failed to include that information in his 
written report. (R. 75: 19). However, Ruff did include other information in his 
written report that included the name brand of Hughes' shirt he was wearing. (R. 75: 
17). Ruff testified that his decision to seize Hughes occurred when Ruff saw Hughes 
run behind the bank and not when Hughes allegedly failed to use a crosswalk. (R. 
75:18). Ruff stated that he could not recall signs posted that patrons could not enter 
the bank parking lot at night or that entering the parking lot would constitute 
trespassing. (R. 75:19). Following his testimony, Officer Ruff removed himself from 
the courtroom, walking right out of the courtroom without having been formally 
excused by the Court. (R. 75: 21). 
4 
In denying his motion, the trial court found the officer "had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to make a stop, that stop simply being based upon the totality of 
the circumstances at the time, those being the 2 a.m. in the morning, 25 degrees, 
running down the street, and with jeans and a t-shirt, that that's a sufficient basis for 
the Court- for the officer to have reasonable articulable suspicion that an infraction 
that occurred at being [sic] jay-walking was sufficient for the stop." (R. 76: 9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The level two stop and detention of Hughes, which ultimately led to Officer 
Ruff discovering additional reason to detain Hughes, was not justified by reasonable, 
articulable suspicion and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, all evidence discovered after that 
unlawful detention must be excluded as fruits of the poisonous tree. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HUGHES5 MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS WHERE THE LEVEL TWO STOP AND DETENTION, WHICH LED 
TO FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF HUGHES, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects people from 
"unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. There are three levels 
5 
of encounters between police officers and citizens which are considered to be 
constitutionally permissible. Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000). Each level requires a different degree of justification under the Fourth 
Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
The three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between law 
enforcement officers and the public are: "(1) a n officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being committed." State v. Deitman, 739 P2d 616, 
617-618 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)(citations omitted). The limited issue in this case 
is whether Officer Ruffs action of turning on his red and blue lights, tapping his siren 
and announcing over his PA system his status as a police officer and ordering Hughes 
to stop was justified at its inception. This case is correctly categorized as a level two 
stop. (R. 75: 21). In order for a law enforcement officer to justify a level two stop, 
the officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that crime is afoot. See, State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1140, (Utah 1994). 
6 
"'Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure5 
within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment [ ], even though the purpose of the 
stop is limited and the resulting detention brief."' State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,11 28, 
63 P.3d 463 (quoting De/aware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 
660 (1979)). To determine whether such a traffic stop is reasonable requires a two 
step process: One, a[w]as the police officer's action justified at its inception?" Two, 
"[w]as the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first place?" Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at 1f 29; Lopez, 
873 P.2d at 1131-32. Hughes did not challenge before the trial court the scope of the 
detention. Consequently, the analysis here will address only whether Ruffs actions 
were justified at the inception. 
Hughes was seized in violation of his constitutional protections. Officer Ruff 
testified that he witnessed Hughes "running" at 2:30 AM, when the temperature was 
in the 20's and Hughes was not wearing workout clothing or a coat; that Hughes was 
wearing a t-shirt and jeans and that allegedly he did not use a crosswalk when 
"running" across the street and entering a bank parking lot. (R. 75: 5-7). Based on 
those observations, Officer Ruff turned on his red and blue lights and stopped Hughes. 
(R. 75: 18). Ruff made the decision to seize Hughes based on Ruffs incorrect legal 
conclusion that Hughes was trespassing onto private property. (R. 75: 18). 
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Banks have given their permission to enter onto their property after banking 
hours to use ATM machines. Hughes suggests that it is not uncommon for the public 
to take advantage of ATM machines at all hours of the day and night for unlimited 
reasons. The person entering bank owned property may need to acquire cash to hail 
a cab, buy groceries after their swing shift, buy some beer at a local 7-11, or even to 
pay a babysitter when they get home after an office party. The scenarios as to why 
someone would go onto bank owned property and use an ATM machine are endless. 
As the Supreme Court has clearly stated, this Court's proper role is to zealously "guard 
against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon 
personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution 
requires." Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, this Court should also consider what 
was not included in Officer Ruffs written report. Officer Ruff conceded on cross-
examination that he did not mention anywhere in his report that he witnessed Hughes 
fail to use a crosswalk. (R. 75: 14). Under the totality analysis, the Court should 
view as suspect Officer Ruffs clear recollection of the events that occurred almost 10 
months prior to his testimony. During the ensuing 10 month period Officer Ruff was 
involved with more than 100 intervening detentions of various subjects. (R. 75:15). 
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Reasonable minds would likely question the officer's remarkable memory of this one 
instance in the distant past. 
An obvious example that supports this conclusion was elicited on cross-
examination. Officer Ruff was questioned about whether the Defendant was wearing 
running shoes and the officer conceded that he did not remember. (R. 75: 19). 
However, the officer contends that he clearly remembers critical facts that could 
possibly justify a legal seizure of Hughes. (R. 75: 15-19). 
Also, Officer Ruffs inclusion of information regarding what type of t-shirt the 
Defendant was wearing should be considered by the Court in this analysis. Officer 
Ruff was compelled to put in his written report the fact that Hughes was wearing a 
shirt with the name-brand "Hollister" written on the front. During cross-examination, 
Officer Ruff conceded that this name-brand is not associated with criminal activity in 
his mind. (R. 75: 17). During the time the facts were most clear to Officer Ruff he 
felt compelled to provide a description of the t-shirt worn by Hughes; presumably so 
he would not forget. The failure of Officer Ruff to include critical information in the 
written report yet claiming the ability to recall the necessary information, very clearly, 
10 months later in a court proceeding should be evaluated by this Court under the 
totality analysis. Hughes argues that Officer Ruffs failure to memorialize in his 
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written report a legal basis that may have supported a seizure and then later testifying 
that he vividly recalls information not in the official written police report is suspect. 
Hughes is not suggesting that the trial court is not in the best position to have 
judged the credibility of Officer Ruff. While it is true that this Court will grant no 
deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts in search and seizure 
cases, this Court will review the district court's factual findings "under a clearly 
erroneous standard." Brake, 2004 UT 95 at 1115. "The judge is the fact finder at such 
a hearing, and as such, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses." State v. 
Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927, 929 n. 6 (Utah 1982). However, this Court must still 
engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis which requires a full analysis 
including the fact that Ruff failed to mention in his written report any suggestion that 
Hughes failed to use a crosswalk as well as Ruffs incorrect legal conclusion that 
Hughes was trespassing onto private property. 
It is not simply a question of whether the trial court found Ruff a credible 
witness. In fact, it seems the trial court did have reservations when Ruff excused 
himself from the courtroom without permission enough that the trial court noted it on 
the record. (R. 75: 21). 
Not without import in this analysis is the fact that not included among the seven 
counts filed in the Information is the charge of Failing to Use a Crosswalk in violation 
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of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-1003. Nor was a charge of trespassing pursued by 
the City. The City obviously would have had difficulty charging the offenses in the 
Information as these actions did not appear anywhere in Officer Ruffs written report. 
Again, there must be state-wide standards for police to follow as established by this 
Court. See, State v. Barker, 229 P.3d 650, quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,1f 12, 
78 P.3d 590. If this Court does not reverse the district court in this instance, a new 
state-wide standard will be created allowing police to seize any individual who enters 
bank owned property after hours whether or not they are there to use an ATM. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Hughes requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and remand this case to the Third District Court for further proceedings. 
DATED t h i s ^ £ day of July, 2010. 
Jon D. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Addm. 1 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
SIMARJIT S. GILL. #6389 
SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR 
Dawn W.Emery. #10443 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office 
349 South 200 East. Fifth Floor 
Sail Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 535-7767 
Facsimile: (801)535-7253 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. • 
AUSTIN JAMES HUGHES. 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 095900065 
JUDGE Randall Skanchy 
This matter came before the Court on January 4. 2010, for a hearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. The Plaintiff. Salt Lake City Corporation, was represented by Dawn W. 
Emery. Mr. Jon D. Williams argued the motion to suppress on behalf of defendant. Identity and 
jurisdiction were stipulated to for the purpose of the motion hearing. 
The issue before the Court was whether Officer Ruff had reasonable suspicion to stop the 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS 
The Court, having heard evidence, made the following findings: 
1. Stop was at 2:00 a.m. 
2. It was 25 degrees out. 
3. Defendant was running down the street with jeans and a t-shirt. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop under a totality of 
the circumstances. 
2. There was a sufficient basis for the officer to have reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the infraction of jaywalking had occurred. 
The Court's order is as follows Defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED. 
Dated this PQ> day of April 2010. 
Dawn W. Emery 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Jon Williams 
Attorney for defendant 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she caused the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress to be sent via [ ] courier. [ ] delivered, 
[3E] email [ ] sent via U.S. mail and [ ] faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the 
Defendant's attorney: 
Jon Williams 
Attorney for Defendant 
341 South Main Street Suite 406 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Dated this day of April. 2010. 
Dawn W. Emery 
Assistant Citv Prosecutor 
Transcript of Oral Ruling of the Court 
morning, 25 degrees outside, someone running or sprinting, as the 
officer tried to opine at the hearing, without wearing a jacket, 
3 or now reflective gear. That's, J think, the first that that's 
4 I come up is from the City's -- in the City's pleading. Is that a 
basis to seize someone with (inaudible) and I suggest that it/s 
6 not. I would ask the Court to grant our motion. 
7 THE COURT: Well, thank you for the briefing as well as 
8 the arguments. It is the defendant's motion, so I think they got 
9 the last word. They ultimately had their argument and you've had 
10 that argument. 
11 I'm going to deny the motion to suppress based upon 
12 this Court's finding that the officer had reasonable articulable 
13 suspicion to make a stop, that stop simply being based upon the 
14 totality of the circumstances at the time, those being the 2 a.m. 
15 in the morning, 25 degrees, running down the street, and with 
16 jeans and a t-shirt, that that's a sufficient basis for the 
17 Court -- for the officer to have reasonable articulable suspicion 
18 that an infraction that occurred at being jay-walking was 
19 sufficient for the stop. 
2 0 Okay. If the City will prepare the order. 
21 MS. EMERY: Thank you, your Honor. 
'22 MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, for purposes of scheduling, 
23 could we just set this out for a pre-trial date? 
24 THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you. 
